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"Justice O'Connor's Husband Finds New Love," reported CBS
News in 2007.' John O'Connor, who married the Justice in 1952, was
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease in 1990. The Justice resigned from
the Supreme Court in 2005 to move him to an assisted living facility,
where he soon fell in love with another Alzheimer's patient.2 Justice
O'Connor's response to news of the romance was to be glad that her
husband was happy, but many spouses and families are not so emotional-
ly generous.3 Other news stories report that families are horrified to find
their elderly spouses or parents in new relationships and insistent that the
romance be terminated. In one case, the son of an elderly man with de-
mentia required the facility to keep his father's girlfriend away from him,
and eventually moved his father to another facility, insisting that neither
his father nor his girlfriend be told in advance of the change.4 In another
case, once the family learned that their seventy-two-year-old mother was
having sex with a sixty-eight-year-old man, they became irate "and
threatened to sue because they didn't picture their mom having sex while
she had grandkids running around the nursing home."5
The human need for intimacy and physical contact has been well es-
tablished in various studies, but until recently such research often ig-
nored the elderly. Newer articles attempt to fill that gap, arguing that
"life-long sexual function ... [has come to be seen as] a primary compo-
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1. Justice O'Connor's Husband Finds New Love: Retired Supreme Court Justice's Spouse
Forms Romance with Fellow Alzheimer's Patient, CBS NEWS, Nov. 13, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11 /13/national/mai13494982.shtml?source=search-story.
2. Suzanne McCarroll, Sandra Day O'Connor Makes Alzheimer's Plea, CBS4DENVER, May
14,2008, http://cbs4denver.com/health/Sandra.Day.O.2.724461.html.
3. Kate Zemike, STILL MANY SPLENDORED; Love In the Time of Dementia, N.Y. TIMES,
November 18, 2007, § 4, available at http://query.nytimes.congst/fullpage.html?res=
9D01E2D91030F93BA25752C1A9619C8B63&scp=2&sq=LOVE%20N%20THE%2OTLME%200
F%20DEMENTIA&st=cse (quoting Dr. Thomas R. Cole, director of the McGovern Center for
Health, Humanities and the Human Spirit at the University of Texas).
4. Melinda Henneberger, An Affair to Remember, SLATE, June 10, 2008,
http://www.slate.comid/2192178/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
5. Sex In Nursing Homes, THE KENTUCKY POST, July 12, 2003, at Al, available at
http://www.cincinnati.com/text/kypost/2003/07/12/sex071203 .html.
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nent of achieving successful ageing in general."6 The need for intimate
relationships, rather than disappearing as one grows older, may actually
increase as one copes with loss: the loss of family members, declining
health, dislocation from a long-time home, and other factors. 7 The bene-
fits of intimacy have been well established, contributing to a better quali-
ty of life and health. 8 The United States Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of intimate association by protecting individuals from
government intrusion into their private lives. The term "freedom of in-
timate association" was first used by the Court in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, in which Justice Brennan spoke of a "line of decisions [in
which] the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain
certain human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by
the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme." 9 More
recently, the Court struck down a statute that forbade persons of the same
sex from engaging in certain types of private sexual conduct.10 "Liber-
ty," declared Justice Kennedy, "presumes an autonomy of self that in-
cludes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct."' This liberty goes beyond the right of a married couple to choose
whether to use contraceptives12 or to marry someone of another race;13 it
also protects unmarried individuals in exercising their personal rights.'
4
While no law prohibits the elderly or residents of nursing homes from
engaging in intimate conduct, and thus the freedom of intimate associa-
tion is not directly involved, the practice at such facilities is to actively
discourage such conduct. In doing so, facilities may be violating federal
and state statutes enumerating patient rights.
For elderly living in their own homes, the freedom of intimate asso-
ciation may have gone to the opposite extreme. Eager to support an in-
6. Merryn Gott, Sexual Health and the New Ageing, 35 AGE & AGEING 106, 106 (2006),
available at http://ageing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/fullI35/2/106 (citing Stephen Katz and
Barbara Marshall, New Sex For Old: Lifestyles, Consumerism, and the Ethics of Aging Well, 17 J.
AGING STUDIES 3, 12 (2003), available at http://www.trentu.ca/academic/sociology/
faculty/documents/NewSexForOld-000.pdf, and Merryn Gott and Sharron Hinchliff, How Important
is Sex in Later Life? The Views of Older People, 56 Soc. SCI. MED. 8, 1617, 1626 (2003)).
7. Jennifer Sisk, Sexuality in Nursing Homes: Preserving Rights, Promoting Well-being,
AGING WELL, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.agingwellmag.com/septstory3.shtml.
8. Id.; Steven H. Miles & Kara Parker, Sexuality in the Nursing Home: latrogenic Loneli-
ness, 23 GENERATIONS 36, 36 (1999).
9. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984). In contrast, the other line of
decisions recognize "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by
the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion." Id. at 618.
10. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
11. Id. at 562.
12. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965).
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
14. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating a statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); see also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (invalidating a New York law forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to
persons under sixteen years of age).
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dividual's right to marry, and loathe to allow any third person to interfere
with that relationship, states have adopted policies and statutes that may
leave some elderly persons vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Thus, elderly
people who lack family to care for them at home face two tough choices.
They can either stay in their homes and retain a great deal of freedom
over their personal affairs, or they can go to a facility, where they may
find their freedom severely restricted. Is there a solution between these
two extremes?
The number of people facing this choice in the near future is poten-
tially vast. The population of Americans sixty-five years and older
doubled from seventeen million in 1960 to thirty-five million in 2000,15
and is expected to double again to more than seventy million in 2030.16
A recent study found that 48% of people over age sixty are sexually ac-
tive. 17 Many people maintain sexual interest into their nineties. 18 Those
in assisted living facilities or nursing homes may also be sexually active,
as evidenced by articles in professional publications and the popular
press. 19
While the issue of freedom of intimate association is a problem for
elderly people in general, it is especially acute for those with dementia.
Over five million Americans have been diagnosed with Alzheimer's dis-
ease, and the number is expected to increase dramatically, with as many
as sixteen million by 2050.20 A recent study published in Neuroepidemi-
ology estimated that 13.9% of Americans age seventy-one and over, or
about 3.4 million people, have some form of dementia.2 1 Alzheimer's
disease accounted for over two-thirds (69.9%) of all dementia diagnos-
es.22 Dementia does not end the need for intimacy; while sexual intima-
cy where one partner has Alzheimer's may decrease it can still be a va-
lued aspect of the relationship.23
15. John D. DeLamater & Morgan Sill, Sexual Desire in Later Life, 42 THE JOURNAL OF SEX
RESEARCH, 138 (2005).
16. Id. at 125.
17. Janet K. Feldkamp, Navigating the Uncertain Legal Waters of Resident Sexuality: Resi-
dents' Rights to Sexual Expression Can Create Complicated Issues for Facilities and Family Mem-
bers, NURSING HOMES, Feb. 2003, at 62.
18. Michael Bauer et al., Sexuality, Health Care and the Older Person: An Overview of the
Literature, 2 INT'L J. OF OLDER PEOPLE NURSING, 63, 64 (2007); Stacy Lindau et al., A Study of
Sexuality and Health Among Older Adults in the United States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762, 772
(2007).
19. See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 7; Miles & Parker, supra note 8; Sex In Nursing Homes, supra
note 5.
20. McCarroll, supra note 2.
21. Brenda Plassman et al., Prevalence of Dementia in the United States: The Aging, Demo-
graphics, and Memory Study, 29 NEUROEPIDEMOLOGY 125, 125 (2007).
22. Id. at 128. Vascular dementia, usually caused by a stroke, accounted for 17.4%; the
remaining 12.7% of cases included "dementia, undetermined etiology," Parkinson's dementia,
alcoholic dementia, and traumatic brain injury, among others. Id.
23. Christian Derousene et al., Sexual Behavior and Changes in Alzheimer's Disease, 10
ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE & RELATED DISORDERS 86, 92 (1996).
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This article will explore two critical issues facing the elderly: the
lack of personal freedom suffered by those who move into large assisted
living facilities and nursing homes, versus the lack of social support for
those who remain in their own homes. Part I discusses those in institu-
tions, and contrasts the federal and state laws that attempt to secure per-
sonal privacy for the elderly with the actual practice in some facilities.
In many cases, especially if the elderly person has some cognitive im-
pairment, institutions assume that the person is incapable of consenting
to physical contact, thus reversing traditional rape law. Part II compares
these restrictions with the virtual absence of any oversight of elderly in
their own homes, and the almost conclusive presumption that a marriage
is valid. The result in some cases is that the elderly are being taken ad-
vantage of by unscrupulous caregivers, even in states that have legisla-
tion attempting to protect them. Part I11 looks at innovative solutions to
these problems, including education, new legislation, better living condi-
tions for seniors, and a more assertive role for the judiciary.
I. ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES AND NURSING HOMES
In 1987 Congress enacted the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act as
part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, ensuring that residents
of nursing facilities would have a right of privacy and immediate access
by family and other visitors. 24 The Act requires the nursing home to give
notice of a transfer and explain why it is necessary before moving the
patient.2 5 Federal law also grants residents of a Medicare or Medicaid
certified nursing facility the right to privacy, including full visual and
26auditory privacy.
Many states have enacted a Patient's or Nursing Home Bill of
Rights purporting to give residents a right of privacy and a right to asso-
27ciate. An Alaska law declares that "a resident of an assisted living
home has the right to ... close the door of the resident's room at any
time, including during visits in the room with guests or other residents..
S.,,28 Arkansas and Florida laws give residents "the right to private and
uncensored communication, including.., visiting with any person of the
resident's choice during visiting hours ....,9 Statutes allow residents
"to close room doors and to have facility personnel knock before enter-
ing the room, except in the case of an emergency or unless medically
24. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(iii) (privacy),
(c)(3) (access and visitation rights) (2008).
25. Id. § (c)(2)(B)(i)(I).
26. Feldkamp, supra note 17.
27. Jeffrey Spitzer-Resnick & Maya Krajcinovic, Protecting the Rights of Nursing Home
Residents: How Tort Liability Interacts with Statutory Protections, 19 NOVA L. REV. 629, 633-34
(1995).
28. ALASKA STAT. § 47.33.300(a)(5) (2008).




contraindicated.,, 30 New York has regulations to ensure that "[r]esident
rooms shall be designed and equipped for adequate nursing care, comfort
and privacy of residents.' California law requires each person admitted
to a residential care facility for the elderly to sign a document that he or
she has received a statement of "Personal Rights" including a right "to
have his/her visitors . . . permitted to visit privately during reasonable
hours and without prior notice, provided that the rights of other residents
are not infringed upon. ' '32 A joint publication of AARP Tennessee and
the Legal Aid Society of Middle Tennessee declares, "You have the right
to visit in private with anyone during reasonable hours. The nursing
home can keep you from having such visits only if: it would harm the
health and safety of a resident or staff member; or it could harm the
property of a resident, staff member, or the nursing home.,
33
The practice, however, is altogether different. Many nursing homes
and assisted living facilities do not allow residents to lock their doors,
and staff use a "knock and enter" policy without waiting for a response.34
Many facilities have no private rooms, and use curtains to separate
roommates, not walls. Sexual intimacy among residents is actively dis-
couraged by staff; published studies indicate that married and single resi-
dents who wish to be intimate "have been deprived of privacy, have been
restrained, have had clothes put on backwards, and have been put in zip-
perless jumpsuits, separated, or forced to resort to subterfuge such as
locking themselves in bathrooms., 35  Many nursing homes have a
framework of "supervised informed consent" in which nurses or social
workers meet with the residents individually and together to discuss the
sexual activity.36 Nursing home staff may prohibit sexual activity direct-
ly, or discourage it indirectly by harassing and ridiculing residents about
their relationships. 37 Even at facilities known for their progressive poli-
cies toward residents' intimate affairs, staff will notify the family as well
as social workers and other staff when a relationship comes to their atten-
tion.38
If both parties are fully competent, there seems to be no legal or
medical justification for an intervention by the nursing home or by the
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.022(1)(m) (2008).
31. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 415.29(c) (2008).
32. CA. CODE OF REGS. tit. 22, § 87468(a)( 11) (2008).
33. AARP TENNESSEE AND LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE, YOU HAVE RIGHTS
IN A NURSING HOME 10 (2001).
34. Madonna H. Meyer & Came Roseamelia, Emerging Issues for Older Couples: Protecting
Income and Assets, Right to Intimacy, and End-of-Life Decisions, GENERATIONS, Fall 2007, at 66,
68.
35. Miles & Parker, supra note 8, at 39.
36. Id.
37. Meyer & Roseamelia, supra note 34, at 68.
38. Douglas J. Edwards, Sex and Intimacy in the Nursing Home, NURSING HOMES: LONG
TERM CARE MANAGEMENT, Feb. 2003, at 18; Dirk Johnson & Julie Scelfo, Sex, Love, and Nursing
Homes, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 2004, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/52779/output/print.
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families, although such interventions regularly occur.39 The issue be-
comes complicated when a resident has a cognitive impairment such as
dementia. Does someone with advanced Alzheimer's disease have the
requisite capacity to consent to sex? What if the resident mistakenly
believes that her partner is her spouse, or does not understand that her
spouse is still alive? Administrators may feel compelled to inform fami-
ly members when their relative with dementia is involved with another
person, and may agree to take steps to terminate the relationship. 40 Cu-
riously, in none of the cited articles is there any indication that the elder-
ly person was in distress or felt pressured to engage in the activity.41
Instead, silence has somehow been interpreted as the equivalent of lack
of consent. Even in cases where the couple is married, nursing homes
have refused visitation rights to a spouse on the grounds that the resident
is incapable of consent. In one case, Drake nursing home in Ohio re-
fused a husband's request for an overnight visit with his wife, who had
suffered a stroke which rendered her incompetent. 42 The nursing home
explained that "if he were to molest his wife, she might later regain her
competence and sue Drake. 4 3 Mr. Belinky sued the nursing home for
permission to have overnight visits with his wife. The court determined
that Mr. Belinky had no standing to sue on his own behalf, because the
law only protected the rights of nursing home residents, but he could sue
on behalf of his wife. Ohio law states that one member of a patient's
family may visit the patient at any time, provided, however, the operator
may make reasonable rules to insure that such visit will not unduly dis-
turb other patients or residents or interfere with the operation of the
home. 44 The court remanded on the question of whether the center had
reasonable rules that precluded an overnight visit.45 The fact that Mrs.
Belinky may have lacked competence to consent to the visit was never
discussed by the court.
Is it reasonable, or legal, for a nursing home to assume that an elder-
ly patient is incapable of consenting to sex? The Ohio court in Belinky
thought not, but many nursing home administrators, fearful of suits alleg-
ing sexual assault, believe otherwise, especially where one or both part-
ners is not fully competent. American rape law has changed a great deal
from its seventeenth-century origins, but perhaps this change goes too
far. Early American law made rape a difficult crime to prove. Rape
39. Feldkamp, supra note 17; Johnson & Scelfo, supra note 38 (quoting a 65-year-old resi-
dent who "wanted some privacy with a lady friend: 'But we knew we'd be evicted from the facility
if we got caught"').
40. See, e.g., Henneberger, supra note 4.
41. Id.; see also Sex In Nursing Homes, supra note 5.
42. Belinky v. Drake Ctr., Inc., 690 N.E.2d 1302, 1305-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
43. Id. Mrs. Belinky would not be able to sue her husband, however, as Ohio exempts spous-
es from sexual battery. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A) (2008) ("No person shall engage in
sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply . .
44. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3701-17-09(d).
45. Belinky, 690 N.E.2d at 1309.
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could not be committed by one's spouse.46 Three theories once formed
the bases of marital immunity: first, wives were characterized as the
property of their husbands; second, the husband and wife were unified in
marriage as one entity and thus one could not be charged with assaulting
oneself; or third, by marrying, a woman gave her consent to sex with her
husband. All three have been attacked as outdated and sexist. 47 While
some jurisdictions still retain marital immunity in some form and thus
presume consent to sexual activity, at least twenty-four states have ab-
48olished marital immunity to rape.
In cases where rape charges could be brought, what evidence suffic-
es to show lack of consent? In early American law, for parties not mar-
ried to each other, the law presumed consent unless the victim earnestly
or reasonably resisted, even questioning whether mere words were
enough to overcome a presumption of consent. 49 Thus, at one time some
states required "utmost resistance" to prove lack of consent. 50  Today
most states have dropped the necessity of showing physical resistance by
the victim, holding that words or conduct may be sufficient to show lack
of consent.51 Nursing home staff have now taken this a step further by
presuming the complete inability of a patient with dementia to consent.52
Staff may regard intimacy as something to be ridiculed or actively dis-
couraged in residents, rather than as a part of healthy human behavior.
5 3
This assumption arguably violates the Patient's Bill of Rights and is far
too broad. Even those with severe Alzheimer's may retain the ability to
consent in certain circumstances.54
The most difficult problem may be the situation where one partner
mistakenly believes the other is her spouse. The Model Penal Code de-
fines the crime of "gross sexual imposition" as occurring when a man has
sexual intercourse with a woman not his wife if "he knows that ... she
submits because she mistakenly supposes that he is her husband. '55 If
the man is capable of recognizing her mistake, he may be committing a
crime.
For those with no cognitive impairments, simply making them
aware that they have the right to privacy and to sexual intimacy in the
nursing home may be enough. Statutes like California's notification
46. Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Infe-
rences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1456 (2003).
47. Id. at 1478-84.
48. Id. at 1470-71.
49. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 17.4 (2d ed. 2008).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Johnson & Scelfo, supra note 38.
53. Miles & Parker, supra note 8, at 23, 38.
54. Daniel Kuhn, Intimacy, Sexuality, and Residents with Dementia, 3 ALZHEIMER'S CARE
QUARTERLY 165, 167 (2002).
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(c) (1962).
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law56 are a start; articles in popular publications, and training for staff,
may also help. For elderly with cognitive impairments, much more will
be needed to reverse the current assumption that sex is nonconsensual
and must always be prohibited.
II. ELDERLY WITH DEMENTIA AND IN-HOME CARE
Freedom of intimate association is not generally an issue for elderly
who live alone. The problem may instead be too much freedom, which
can leave them prey to unscrupulous persons. Realizing the vulnerability
of some elderly, California and Idaho have enacted statutes raising a pre-
sumption of undue influence in cases where a caregiver is named in a
will or other donative instrument.57  Long-time friends of the elderly
person who provide care without pay are included in the definition of
"care custodians" in California;58 Idaho includes those working in the
testator's own home.59 To receive the donative transfer, the caregiver
must rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing
evidence. 60 The California Supreme Court noted that California's statute
was originally enacted in 1993 in response to reports that an Orange
County attorney who represented a large number of Leisure World resi-
dents had drafted numerous wills and trusts under which he was a major
or exclusive beneficiary, and had abused his position as trustee or con-
servator in many cases to benefit himself or his law partners.6'
The law was amended in 1997 to add care custodians as presump-
tively prohibited transferees.62 But the California statute continues to
exempt spouses, relatives, and domestic partners of transferors, 63 thus
leaving an opening exploited by unscrupulous caregivers. As long as the
caregiver can marry the dependent elderly person, in most states it is
almost impossible to invalidate the marriage, even in cases where the
elderly person has no idea he or she is married.
Challenging the validity of a marriage has traditionally been diffi-
cult, given the presumption of ceremonial validity, a presumption of
sanity, and restrictions on challenges to a marriage. At common law, a
marriage to a person who lacked competence to understand that he or she
was getting married was void and could be attacked after the incompe-
56. CAL. CODE REGS. 22, § 72527(a)( 11) (West 2008).
57. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (West 2008); Idaho Code Ann. § 15-2-616 (2008).
58. Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1207-08 (2006).
59. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-616.
60. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(d). Another way to provide for the caregiver under California
law is to have the instrument reviewed by an independent attorney who counsels the transferor and
also executes a "Certificate of Independent Review." Id. § 21351(b). The Idaho statute simply says
the presumption is "rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-616.
61. Rice v. Clark, 47 P.3d 300, 304 (2002).
62. Bernard, 139 P.3d at 1205.
63. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(a) states that no presumption of undue influence is raised if
"the transferor is related by blood or marriage to, is a cohabitant with, or is the registered domestic
partner of the transferee," among other exceptions.
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tent spouse's death, although attacks rarely succeeded.64 Today, given
the fundamental right to marry, states have proceeded cautiously in re-
stricting the rights of incompetent people to marry, and are wary of al-
lowing termination of the marriage by third parties, whether before or
after the spouse's death. Even an insane person or one who has been
declared incompetent may still have the capacity to marry.65 As a North
Dakota court stated, "the best accepted test as to whether there is a men-
tal capacity sufficient to contract a valid marriage is whether there is a
capacity to understand the nature of the contract and the duties and re-
sponsibilities which it creates, 66 and thus "mere weakness or imbecility
of mind is not sufficient, nor is eccentricity or partial dementia.' 67 A
recent Alaska case is illustrative of the difficulties of overcoming the
presumption of sanity and the presumption of validity of the marriage.
Lillie Rahm-Riddell already suffered from Alzheimer's disease from
681993 when she met Robert Riddell, a man thirty years her junior. Her
daughter petitioned for an appointment of a conservator in April 1995,
but while that proceeding was pending, Lillie and Robert married. 69 A
conservator was appointed for Lillie; a court also found that Robert had
attacked Lillie and enjoined him from contacting her. Despite that, Ro-
bert removed Lillie from an assisted living home and moved her to Ore-
gon, refusing to reveal Lillie's location even after a court order.70 Lillie
died in Oregon in 1997.71 A court held that Lillie's 1997 will leaving her
entire estate to Robert was invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity.
72
Still, the court found that the marriage was valid and thus Robert was
entitled as a surviving spouse to receive his homestead allowance, family
allowance, and elective share.73 The Alaska Supreme Court refused to
impose a constructive trust despite clear and convincing evidence of Ro-
bert's fraudulent conduct, his physical abuse, and his isolation of Lillie
so that she was "utterly dependent on him for all her needs. 74 The fact
that Robert spirited Lillie away while the conservancy petition was pend-
ing was not sufficient to establish that Lillie failed to understand that she
was getting married. Courts generally have recognized that someone
who needs a conservator might still be competent in certain matters, such
as marriage. The Supreme Court of Illinois, for example, has held that
the appointment of a guardian is not conclusive of the capacity to under-
64. In re Estate of Romano, 246 P. 2d 501, 505 (1952); Terry Turnipseed, How Do I Love
Thee, Let Me Count The Days: Deathbed Marriages in America, 96 KY. L.J. 275, 287 (2007-2008).
65. Geitner v. Townsend, 312 S.E.2d 236,238 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
66. Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8, 14 (N.D. 1960).
67. Fischer v. Adams, 38 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Neb. 1949).
68. Riddell v. Edwards, 32 P.3d 4, 6, 16 (Alaska 2001).
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 19.
73. Riddell v. Edwards, 76 P.3d 847, 853 (Alaska 2003).
74. Id. at 849.
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stand the nature, effect, duties, and obligations of marriage, "although the
former fact is strong evidence of the latter."
75
A few states still follow the common law rule and allow a third par-
ty to challenge the marriage after one spouse's death. Courts in Alabama
and Florida, for example, have voided marriages on grounds of lack of
competence. For example, a daughter sued to annul her mother's mar-
riage in Alabama on the grounds of insanity and intoxication at the time
of the marriage that continued without interruption until the mother's
death three months later.76 While the allegation of intoxication, if prov-
en, would render the marriage merely voidable, insanity would make the
marriage invalid from the time it was entered.77 Florida has allowed
heirs of a woman who alleged that her marriage took place while she was
insane and in a diabetic coma to challenge its validity after her death.78
Some states have codified the common law into statutes that declare
79a marriage of a person who lacks mental capacity is void. Cases in a
few of these states have allowed a challenge to the marriage after the
death of one spouse. New Jersey has allowed such suits on the grounds
of lack of capacity to consent, fraud, or simply based on a court's general
80powers in equity. Similarly, Kentucky has held that a marriage of a
mentally incompetent person is void and thus can be set aside after the
incompetent's death; in contrast, a marriage procured by fraud or duress
is voidable, and can only be annulled while the parties are alive.81 A
court in Pennsylvania invalidated the marriage of an Alzheimer's patient
even though his family had not raised an objection to the validity of the
marriage.
82
Louisiana allows the suit to be brought after a spouse's death, de-
spite language in the statute that appears to be to the contrary. Louisiana
law states: "A marriage is relatively null when the consent of one of the
parties to marry is not freely given. Such a marriage may be declared
null upon application of the party whose consent was not free. '8 3 This
right to nullify the marriage, a court held, may be brought by the succes-
sion representative, interpreting broad language giving the representative
the right to sue to enforce a right of the deceased, whether the action is
75. Pape v. Byrd, 582 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. 1991).
76. Abel v. Waters, 373 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
77. Id. at 1128.
78. Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 1184 (Fla. 1932).
79. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020(1)(a)(2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (2008); NEB.
REv. ST. § 42-103(2) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1(d) (2008); 23 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §
3304(a)(3) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 15-1-5; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47A(a) (Vernon 2008).
80. In re Estate of Santolino, 895 A.2d 506, 514-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
81. Johnson v. Sands, 53 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Ky. 1932). The case was remanded for trial on
the merits; in a subsequent decision, the court determined the husband was not in fact insane, and the
marriage was valid. Johnson v. Sands, 276 Ky. 492 (1939).
82. In re Acker, 48 Pa. D. & C. 4th 489 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. 2000).
83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 95 (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
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personal, real, or mixed.84 Conversely, although a North Carolina statute
appears to codify the common law,85 case law in that state speaks of such
marriages being voidable, rather than void.86
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) Section 208
changed the common law, and now the majority rule in the United States
is that such a marriage is voidable, and thus cannot be challenged after
the death of either spouse.87 Commentary to the UMDA explains why
the law was changed:
The underlying policy reasons for this principle are clear: the tradi-
tional "void marriage" doctrine often imposed unwise and unfair pe-
nalties on innocent "spouses" in stable family situations long after the
questioned marriage occurred. The penalties serve no effective deter-
rent purpose, but cause severe economic dislocations; a spouse may
be denied ... a share in a spouse's estate, after the marriage has been
terminated by the death of the other spouse, despite the fact that the
surviving spouse had no reason to suspect the invalidity of the mar-
riage.
88
Should we return to the common law and void the marriage of an
incompetent elderly person? Alternatively, should courts be bolder in
asserting their equitable powers? Consider the Washington case of Es-
tate of Romano.89 The decedent, age sixty-four, was nearly blind and in
poor physical condition when he married his housekeeper Mary Alice
Sauve. 90 The court found that, at the time of the wedding ceremony,
"Romano was mentally incompetent. He did not realize what he was
doing and was incapable of entering into a contract or consenting to mar-
riage. The trip to Reno [for the wedding] and his participation in the
marriage ceremony were procured by fraud and duress practiced by Mary
Alice Sauve."9' Sauve conceded that the marriage did not comply with
the law of Nevada due to lack of capacity and fraud.92 Still, the court
held that the marriage could not be attacked after Romano's death absent
"fraud of the grossest kind. 93 Such fraud was absent in this case be-
84. Succession of Ricks, 893 So. 2d 98, 100 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 685 (2008) (enacted in 1960)).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (2008).
86. See, e.g., Geitner v. Townsend, 312 S.E.2d 236, 238 (N.C Ct. App. 1984) ("a marriage of
a person incapable of contracting for want of understanding is not void, but voidable," (citing Ivery
v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 730 (1963))).
87. Turnipseed, supra note 64, at 287-289. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.031; ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-12-201; Vance v. Hinch, 222 Ark. 494, 497(1953) (marriage which involves party lacking
mental capacity is voidable but not absolutely void); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210 (West 2008); Husted
v. Husted, 35 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1963); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-111 ()(a).
88. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 208 cmt. 1998 Main Volume (1970) (amended
1971 and 1973), 9A U.L.A. 188 (1998).
89. In re Estate of Romano, 246 P.2d 501 (Wash. 1952).
90. Id. at 502-03.
91. Id. at 503.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 506.
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cause the incompetent spouse lived for almost two years after the mar-
riage, giving ample time for a challenge to the validity of the marriage
while Romano was alive.
94
The New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote of a "Hobson's choice"
in the Legislature's decision that marriage by an incompetent person is
either void or voidable: "The former method [declaring that the marriage
is void] may allow the heirs to step forward after death and claim the
fruit of their own neglect. The latter method [declaring that the marriage
is voidable] may allow a scheming suitor to marry for money. '95 Still,
the court concluded that it was the Legislature's decision, not the court's,
and the Legislature had declared marriage of an incompetent to be void-
able, and thus impossible to attack after the death of one spouse.96
Even if a state is willing to annul the marriage, this may not elimi-
nate the financial incentive. New York, for example, allows the marriage
to be annulled after one party has died,97 but the spouse who exercised
undue influence or fraud is still entitled to his or her elective share.98
Bigamy is treated differently in New York: not only can the marriage be
declared void after one party's death, but the survivor is not treated as a
spouse and thus gets no elective share.99 If a person with dementia enters
into a marriage ceremony with no understanding of its significance,
shouldn't that marriage be treated the same as a bigamous marriage, and
annulled?
In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated a marriage
in Estate of Lint when it found that the wedding had not been properly
solemnized and, as an alternative ground, that fraud of the grossest kind
was practiced on the wife.1°° A woman seriously ill with cancer of the
lung and brain was systematically isolated from her friends and family
by a man, Christian Lint, eighteen years her junior.'0 A will making
Christian the primary beneficiary of her estate was declared invalid by
the trial court on the grounds that it was procured by fraud and undue
influence. 0 2 Citing Romano, the court noted that ordinarily a marriage
cannot be set aside after one spouse's death due to lack of capacity, but
also held that, because the Washington statute does not include lack of
solemnization or gross fraud as reasons to invalidate a marriage, "the
94. Id. at 507.
95. Patey v. Peaslee, 111 A.2d 194, 197 (N.H. 1955).
96. Id. at 196.
97. See, e.g., Levine v. Dumbra, 604 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
98. See, e.g., Parente v. Wenger, 464 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1983); Bennett v. Thomas,
327 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
99. Estate of Dominguez, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1596,26-27 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Nov. 18, 2002).
100. In re Estate of Lint, 957 P.2d 755, 757 (Wash. 1998).
101. Id. at 757-58.
102. Id. at 765.
[Vol. 86:2450
PRIVACY AND AGING
Legislature did not intend to entirely occupy the field."10 3 Thus, a path
was left open to the courts to annul the marriage.
Even while the incompetent spouse is alive, it may be difficult for
others to end the marriage on his or her behalf. A majority of states have
adopted the rule that, absent specific statutory authorization for a third
party to sue for annulment on behalf of the incompetent, only the compe-
tent spouse may sue to end the marriage.' n South Carolina, for example,
has held that a person "who is mentally incompetent as to his property
and his person... may not bring an action for divorce either on his own
behalf or through a guardian."'' 0 5 The rationale often cited by such courts
is that marriage is such a personal commitment that only a spouse can
decide when to end it.' 6 Other courts have adopted the minority view to
allow a guardian to sue to terminate the marriage.107 A few states have
statutes specifically authorizing the spouse's representative to bring suit,
but generally have a short statute of limitations and do not allow suit to
be brought after the spouse's death.1
0 8
The statutes and the case law confound two very different issues.
The first occurs when a valid marriage is entered into, but later one
spouse becomes incompetent. Can a third party sue to end the marriage,
either on behalf of the incompetent while he or she is alive, or on behalf
of the heirs or family once the incompetent is dead? Courts are unders-
tandably reluctant to terminate such a marriage without evidence of what
the incompetent spouse would have wanted. Our scenario is quite differ-
ent: the spouse is unable to understand that he or she is entering into a
marriage at the time of the ceremony. Should the same restrictions on
terminating the marriage apply? Some courts are willing to declare such
a marriage void on the grounds that the requirements for a valid marriage
have not been met. Illinois, for example, requires solemnization of a
marriage by going before a duly authorized officiate and consenting to
marry. °9 David Crockett's children sought to annul the marriage after
their father's death on the grounds that the decedent, suffering from an
inoperable malignant brain tumor, did not say anything at the ceremony
and thus failed to give his consent." 0 After investigating whether Illinois
law allowed proxy marriages and concluding it did not, the court held
103. Id. at 766.
104. See J.A. Connelly, Annotation, Power of Incompetent Spouse's Guardian, Committee, or
Next Friend to Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or Annulment of Marriage, or to Make a
Compromise or Settlement in Such Suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681, § 5(a)-(b) (1966 & Supp. 1993).
105. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993).
106. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Murray, 426 S.E.2d at 784.
Both Nelson and Murray involve a spouse who was competent at the time of the marriage but later
became incompetent.
107. See, e.g., Nelson, 878 P.2d at 338.
108. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-111(2)-(3) (2008) (six months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1506(b) (2008) (ninety days).
109. In re Estate of Crockett, 728 N.E.2d 765, 767 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
110. Id. at 766.
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that the children could challenge the validity of the marriage after the
death of one of the parties."'1
I. SOLUTIONS
Can we find a middle ground, where a person does not need to
choose between giving up intimacy to enter a nursing home, or staying in
his or her own home and thus forfeiting legal protection? Education of
seniors and those who work with them is a good start, but legislation may
be necessary as well. Finally, courts may need to exercise their equitable
powers more frequently.
A. Education
For those in facilities who wish to have more privacy, informing
them of the Patient's Bill of Rights and providing some mechanism for
enforcement will help, at least for those with no cognitive impairments.
Staff training is key to reversing widely held beliefs that residents of
such facilities should not be sexually active,' 2 and to help medical per-
sonnel understand that intimacy and close relationships are important for
better health. An example of comprehensive staff training can be found
in the video produced by the Hebrew Home in Riverdale, New York,
"Freedom of Sexual Expression: Dementia and Resident Rights in Long-
Term Care Facilities."'1 3 As for seniors in their own homes, training of
those issuing marriage licenses and conducting marriage ceremonies may
need to be improved, and existing laws enforced. Why would a clerk
issue a marriage license to a person in a coma?1 4 Several states have
statutes declaring it a misdemeanor to knowingly join a couple who
should not lawfully marry, or issue a license to them for a marriage cer-
emony, but no reported case describes an attempt to prosecute anyone
under these statutes.
15
B. Reconsider Void Versus Voidable Marriages
States are understandably reluctant to allow longstanding marriages
to be attacked, especially when one spouse has died and thus is unavaila-
ble to testify, consent, or object to the proceedings. The legitimacy of
children born to the couple should not be put into doubt years later, but
111. Id. at 771-72. Other irregularities occurred in the marriage ceremony. For example,
although Illinois law requires both parties to appear and sign in the presence of the county clerk-id.
at 766 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/203 (1996))-only Laveme Crockett was present at the
clerk's office to obtain the license. The court did not seem to regard this as a reason to invalidate the
marriage.
112. Hosam K. Kamel & Rarnzi R. Haijar, Sexuality in the Nursing Home, Part 2: Managing
Abnormal Behavior-Legal and Ethical Issues, 4 J. AM. MED. DIR. Assoc. 203, 205 (2003).
113. The Hebrew Home at Riverdale, http://www.hebrewhome.org/nursinghome.asp (last
visited Dec. 18, 2008).
114. Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 138 So. 775, 778 (Fla. 1932).




most states already have statutes declaring that such children are legiti-
mate even if the marriage is later annulled. 1 6 Courts are likewise reluc-
tant to inquire into the reasons for a marriage, which cases involving
fraud or undue influence often require.
Treating the marriage of an incompetent person in the same way
courts have long treated void marriages might be an effective solution.
Even states that do not allow a marriage to be annulled after one spouse's
death have recognized that a marriage can be declared null and void."
17
Thus, a Wisconsin court allowed a post-death challenge to a Texas mar-
riage that violated Wisconsin law imposing a six-month waiting period
after a divorce, and held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
require Wisconsin to recognize a Texas marriage just thirty days after the
divorce decree. 18 A New York court invalidated a bigamous marriage
and held that the husband was not a surviving spouse. 19 In our case, the
family of the incompetent person could seek to have the marriage nulli-
fied. The family's best argument to void the marriage may be to estab-
lish that the technical requirements of the ceremony were not met: the
incompetent person did not appear before the clerk, or did not indicate
consent, as required.
Alternatively, states may want to rewrite their statutes of limitations
to void a marriage. Some statutes give no recourse to the family, even
where there is fraud or undue influence, because the incompetent person
has died shortly after the wedding, and thus there was no realistic oppor-
tunity to challenge its validity. Delaware's statute of limitations is just
ninety days, 120 Colorado's is six months,' 21 and in neither state can the
action be brought after the death of one spouse. Is it necessary to have
such a short time period to sue, and for both spouses to be alive when the
suit is brought? Legislatures must balance recognizing a marriage con-
tracted by one who failed to understand that he or she was getting mar-
ried, against unseemly challenges brought long after the incompetent
spouse's death. One way to balance the two concerns is with a statute of
limitations that survives the spouse's death. A statute could allow a suit
to annul the marriage within a year of the ceremony or when the challen-
ger discovered the marriage, for example, without regard to whether both
spouses were still alive.
116. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-402(4) ("Children bom of a marriage declared invalid
are legitimate."). The statute is based on the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 208.
117. In re Estate of Toutant, 633 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
118. Id. at 699-700.
119. Estate of Dominguez, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1596, 26-27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 18,
2002).
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1506(b)(1) (2008).
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-11 1(2)(a) (2008).
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C. Better Living Conditions for Seniors
Giving seniors a third option-other than large institutions or stay-
ing at home alone-may help obviate the need for lawsuits to secure the
right to intimacy or to annul a marriage. Florida, for example, encourag-
es the establishment of housing for a small number of seniors by subsi-
dizing some of the costs. 122 Geriatrician Dr. William Thomas conceived
Green Houses, facilities for eight to ten elderly people with private
rooms and bathrooms in a home-like setting. 23 These communal hous-
ing arrangements can make seniors less isolated, and thus less vulnerable
to an unscrupulous caregiver. At the same time, because the facilities are
so small, they are more flexible in allowing privacy to the occupants.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is supporting the building of
Green Houses across the country. 124 The U.S. Administration on Aging
has encouraged the establishment of Naturally Occurring Retirement
Communities, or NORCs, by first identifying neighborhoods or buildings
in which a large proportion of the residents are elderly, and then working
to organize resources in the community to help the elderly remain in their
own homes. 25 AARP estimates that about five thousand NORCs now
exist across the country, allowing people to stay in their own homes by
providing health care, food, transportation, and other services. 26 In a
few communities, elderly with substantial resources are designing their
own community housing. The first such example of "elderhoods" was
founded in Davis, California, by twelve residents who designed their
own units and common areas, including a unit to rent to a nurse at below-
market rates. 27 ElderSpirit works on a similar concept of allowing resi-
dents to design the development; ElderSpirit communities are planned in
Virginia, Florida, Kansas, and other places in the United States.'
28
D. Equity
Finally, a court can use its equitable powers more often, especially
in dealing with the marriage of someone who lacks understanding or
competence. Courts have for a long time been willing to assess the equi-
ties in bigamous marriages; why not do so here? A spouse who believed
122. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 430.600-606 (West 2008).
123. Judith Rabig et al., Radical Redesign of Nursing Homes: Applying the Green House
Concept in Tupelo, Mississippi, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 533, 533 (2006).
124. Alice Dembner, 'Green Houses' For Golden Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2006, at
Al.
125. Athan Bezaitis, Changing Choices-Aging in Place in the 21st Century, AGING WELL,
Spring 2008, at 30, available at http://www.agingwellmag.com/07I708p30.shtml. See also Nell
Bernstein, "Aging in Place" Communities Offer Seniors Independence and Support, Caring.com,
July 9, 2008, available at http://www.caring.com/articles/aging-in-place.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also The Elder Cohousing Network,
http://www.abrahampaiss.comElderCohousing/GlacierCircle.htn (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
128. Patricia Leigh Brown, Growing Old Together, in New Kind of Commune, N.Y. TIMES,




his mate was competent to consent to their wedding would not be de-
prived of his statutory share. California, Louisiana, and Texas recognize
the concept of "putative spouse" in bigamous marriages; a good faith
spouse might still take a share. 129 In the case where a decedent is sur-
vived by more than one "spouse," the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act allows courts to apportion property "as appropriate in the circums-
tances and in the interests of justice."' 13  Courts could decline to treat a
spouse acting in bad faith as entitled to a statutory share, on the grounds
of unclean hands. 131 The bad faith spouse could be treated in the same
way as the bigamist was treated at common law, and take nothing by
operation of law. 1
32
CONCLUSION
Current law and practice force seniors to make a difficult choice,
especially for those with some cognitive impairments who lack family
who can care for them. The senior can choose to live in a facility and
give up much of his or her privacy, or can hire someone to provide in-
home help. A number of surveys have found that most elderly want to
stay in their own homes, but may feel compelled to move into a nursing
home for health reasons. 33  Facilitating innovative solutions to allow
seniors to live at home, such as NORCs, or to allow seniors to design
housing that fits their needs, is an important step toward giving seniors
more attractive living options. These new forms of housing, however, do
not address the underlying problems for the many seniors who live in
nursing homes, or who are isolated at home.
For elderly in nursing homes and assisted living facilities, two im-
portant shifts need to occur. One is a change in the attitude of family
members and staff regarding the value and importance of relationships
with others. Education and training will help. If both elderly parties are
fully competent, there seems no reason to justify nursing home policies
requiring that the families be informed of a new friendship with another
129. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West 2008); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.96 (2008); Lee v. Lee, 247
S.W. 828, 830 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923).
130. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 209 (1970) (amended 1971 and 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 192 (1998); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.2, cmt. e (2008).
131. See, e.g., Estate of Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the
status of the putative spouse "belongs only to the party or parties to a void marriage who the trial
court finds to have believed in good faith in the validity of the void marriage").
132. A bigamist might still inherit under the putative spouse's will; courts carefully examine
whether the testator bequest "was founded on her supposed legal relation with [her husband] and not
primarily on their long and intimate association." In re Estate of Carson, 194 P. 5 (Cal. 1920).
133. Lucette Lagnado, Foundation Places Big Bet on 'Green Houses'for Elderly, PITrSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, June 29, 2008 at A-2 (citing a 2003 AARP survey that 1% of Americans over age
fifty with a disability wanted to move to a nursing home); Bob Moos, Boomer Home-Bodies: Want-
ing To Stay Put Isn't New--What's New is the 76 Million Baby Boomers Approaching Golden Pond,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 28, 2004, at IH (citing an AARP survey that about 8 out of 10
elderly want to stay in their own homes).
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resident. Second, existing federal and state laws need to be enforced.
Both already require privacy and a right to associate, including the right
to have visitors, but these laws are often ignored. For elderly living at
home, existing laws may be the obstacle rather than the solution, at least
in cases where an unscrupulous caregiver has tricked the elderly person
into marriage. Short statutes of limitation to invalidate the marriage have
allowed caregivers to inherit, even in cases where the elderly person had
no idea a marriage had taken place. A more caring and creative society
should provide much better alternatives.
